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ABSTRACT
By the end of 2017 Serbia has reached the highest level of industrial production 
in the last quarter of the century. Rapid growth started in mid-2014. However, this 
paper argues that industrial dynamics are accompanied by a moderate technolo-
gical upgrading, insufficient to significant increase of the gross added value of the 
economy. Furthermore, by means of a theoretical and empirical approach – dedu-
ctive methods, statistical and mathematical evaluation, the authors have come to 
the conclusion that there are no uniform development solutions, nor it can be said 
exclusively that industrialization and its technological development are crucial for 
the pace of growth. It is a necessary, not a sufficient condition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The total industrial production in Serbia reached its highest level during the last 25 
years in late 2017. The same conclusion stands for the processing industry.
The previously existing two production maximums from this period have been ex-
ceeded. The first, achieved in late 1997, immediately after the sale of Telekom and 
therefore with a domestic demand that was increased artificially and as a one-off 
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event, lasted until March 19983.  The second occurred at the dawn of the global eco-
nomic crisis, at the time of the strongest conjuncture in March 2008.
An interesting fact is that we were unable to find such a positive episode of trending 
growth in industrial production that started in the summer of 2014 even in the decade 
preceding the breakup of SFRY. We recall that the growth of the physical volume 
of industrial production during the nineteen-eighties was only 0.95% year on year, 
whereas from August 2014 to the beginning of 2018 the average monthly trending 
increases of production were approximately 0.55% (corresponding to an annual in-
crease of 6.8%).
The strong expansion of activities is also very stable, since the average monthly 
trending increase continued with the same intensity in 2017, i.e. at 0.54% per month.
Figure 1.  Industrial production indices in the Republic of Serbia  
(trend cycle, average 2014 = 100)
Source: author’s calculation; Notes: Time series of Industrial Production Indices are 
available on the SORS website, in the database http://data.stat.gov.rs/?caller=0602&langua-
geCode=en-US.
3 During the second half of 1997 industrial production experienced a sudden jump after the injection 
of funds obtained through the sale of Telekom (primarily into the sphere of final consumption, but 
also into revolving loans for businesses). However, the induced growth was very short-lived and 
lasted only six months (production increased with an average monthly rate of 2.2%). During the 
subsequent year of 1998 part of these measures have been transferred in an uncontrolled manner, 
achieving an annual production growth of 3.9% (the effects of Telekom acted as a stimulating, and 
the strengthening of the outer wall of sanctions as a limiting growth factor). In 1999 production 
was already lower by 25.6% than during the previous year, primarily a consequence of the NATO 
aggression, but also the production recession identified during the second half of 1998.
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Thus, the existing dynamics of industrial production are satisfactory, however we 
notice a few interesting moments that need to be commented on. The paper primarily 
deals with the technological intensity of Serbian industry whose modest develop-
ment has been recognized as key constraints on maintaining expansive growth over 
the long term. Before that, let’s look at the acute findings of some authors.
2. Review of previous research
According to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia estimate economic 
growth in period 2015-2017 predominantly was driven by the manufacturing sector. 
However, it’s also recognized by the government that the manufacturing industry 
made the greatest contribution to growth, although its structure is still dominated by 
low-processed, low-value-added products (ERP, 2018). Even since the beginning of 
transition there were no significant changes in industry branches that contribute the 
most to GVA generation like the hi-tech industry. Some author argue that structural 
changes in Serbia which occurred during transition have not resulted with sufficient 
growth that could provide sustainable improvement as compared to either other tran-
sitional countries or EU average (Nikolić & Zubović, 2014).
The problem of low specialization was also noticed. The level of specialization of 
manufacturing sector in Serbia is low in comparison to the phase of the country’s 
industrial development. Many empirical studies (Mićić, et al, 2018) point to the fact 
that Serbia needs to implement (smart) specialization concept as a new innovative 
industrial policy agenda in order to effectively channel the investments to techno-
logy innovation projects and their implementation in those sectors/industries that 
have comparative advantage. Smart specialization would encourage structural chan-
ges in the manufacturing industry and the development of new manufacturing and 
productive activities, while the major generators of GVA and employment would 
shift towards knowledge- and technology- intensive activities.
The frequent topic of research was a phenomenon of reindustrialization (Adžić&Sto-
jić, 2016). Empirical evidence that pointed to the unsustainability of the earlier de-
velopment model and the urgent need of reindustrialization was first surfaced by a 
group of authors in the research “Serbian post-crisis economic growth and develop-
ment model 2011-2020” (USAiD, 2010). Not long after SEC and at that time called 
‘The National Council for Economic Recovery’ established by the Government of 
the Republic of Serbia issued its own publication “Reindustrialization Strategy of 
Serbia - A Draft Version” (SEC, 2013) focuses its criticism on the ability of “the 
market hidden hand” to solve the problems of industrial decline and backwardness 
in Serbia (Drašković, 2014).
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Nowadays, some authors believe that reindustrialization is necessary and possible 
only in those industries that have considerable potential for growth of competitive-
ness on the international market. The key assumptions for this are constant growth 
of innovation and productivity, as well as other factors that essentially rely on new 
knowledge and new technology. In this context, governments, rather than the mar-
kets, are becoming the main change drivers, as they can contribute to creating the 
necessary industrial state of mind, which implies new redistribution of tasks and 
effects of labor among the key stakeholders in the process of creating new values: 
employees, owners, government, science, education, etc. (Pokrajac, at al, 2016).
3. A few facts about the driving forces 
Firstly, the impression of the very good results achieved by Serbia is ruined by the 
persistent low volume, crucially decreased during the first half of the nineteen-nine-
ties. In this regard, since the current production level is still 44.2% lower than ave-
rage production in 1990, it is easy to calculate that Serbia will have to wait to leave 
the transitional gap until at least 2026.
Due to the faster growth of industrial production than the growth of the gross dome-
stic product, its relative share in the gross added value of the economy is increasing. 
It is above the European average and comparable with the most successful countries. 
This indicatory for Serbia in 2017 amounts to 26.4%, while at the same time in Ger-
many industry comprised 25.7% of the total gross added value.
If the GDP’s lag after the growth of industry in Serbia were to be retained for a few 
more years it would very quickly reach the level of the Czech Republic or Ireland, 
i.e. European countries where industrialization has progressed the furthest, in rela-
tive terms.
In addition to stability, the growth of industrial production since 2014 is also cha-
racterized by increasing quality. Growth is more sustainable, led dominantly by 
exports, and during 2017 also by investments. Furthermore, the result is even more 
important because it was achieved during a time of implementation of severe fiscal 
consolidation measures that had an unfavourable impact on domestic demand.
The structural problem of Serbia is a low technological level of production that is 
not generating growth, or is manifested in a divergent trend of the physical volume 
and gross added value. For example, Serbia holds the world record in relative export 
growth during the last several years! However, the Serbian industry and exports 
rely on low-technology, i.e. low-accumulation areas of production. They generate a 
surplus (good for the balance of payments), but they do not contribute to economic 
growth. Therefore it should be noted that subsidies for opening jobs, an important 
33BH ECONOMIC FORUM
lever for attracting foreign investors during the past four years, do not belong among 
determinants of the growth of investments that will create a competitive economy – 
they may even be counter-productive in that regard.
The share of areas belonging to medium-high and high technology is only 26% of 
the processing industry. Furthermore, this technologically more developed segment 
of production created only 765 euros per capita in 2016. At the same time this type 
of production in Bulgaria was worth 26% more, in Romania 2.2 times more, in Slo-
venia 5.2 times more, and in Germany a whole 10.3 times more.
The key sources of accelerated growth of the GDP that we desire in the mid-term 
must clearly be more productive activities. Despite serious positive steps in its eco-
nomy, Serbia remains in a state of structural and technological imbalance, preven-
ting the creation of sustainable economic dynamics. In this regard, an important 
component of economic policy must be an active structural-investment policy as a 
mechanism for securing the modernization of the production structure. Economic 
development in the long-term will be a function of the complexity and efficiency of 
its production structure. These processes are tied to technological changes and the 
introduction of innovation, significant investment into education, and the research 
and development sector.
If, on the other hand, we analyse quality, it is interesting to note certain data re-
garding changes to the technological structure of manufacturing. Namely, abstra-
cting all methodological problems regarding the division of manufacturing areas 
according to achieved technological level, during recent years we note a tendency 
of slight relative structural changes of manufacturing in favour of areas with higher 
technological content. 
Figure 2.  Changing the technological structure of Serbian Manufacturing
Source: Author’s calculation
UNIVERSITY OF ZENICA FACULTY OF ECONOMICS34
Regarding the period 2010-2017, the share of medium-high technology areas of pro-
cessing production in generating added value for this sector has doubled, from 11% 
to 22%. Within this technological subset of manufacturing the highest performance 
is very steadily registered by the area of chemicals and chemical product manufactu-
re. For example, it is responsible for as much as 46% of the increase of added value 
of the entire subset of medium-high technological areas during the period 2014-
2017. It is followed by the manufacture of unmentioned machinery and unmentioned 
equipment with 32.1%, and the manufacture of electrical equipment with 12.3%.
The area of manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and the manufa-
cture of other forms of transport showed a single-digit contribution to the growth of 
added value for this subset of the processing industry, 8.9% and 0.7%, respectively.
High-technology areas, that include the manufacture of computers, electronic and 
optical products, and the manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and prepa-
rations, reduced their share of the processing industry slightly, exclusively due to 
the poor performance of the pharmaceutical industry that has experienced, in the 
long-term, a slight decrease since 2008. Nevertheless, viewed jointly, the areas of 
high-technology and medium-high technology note a clear growth of relative impor-
tance in the generation of added value for the processing sector (e.g. from 17% in 
2010 to 26% in 2017).
Is this 26% a sufficient basis to accelerate the tempo of growth of the overall indu-
strial production, and ultimately the GDP? Comparing the technological structure of 
Serbia with three countries: German, Hungary and Estonia, it is hard to get a clear 
answer.
Figure 3.  Technological structure of the manufacturing sector, in the  
observed countries in 2017.
Source: Author’s calculation
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Namely, these three countries have not been selected randomly. Germany is the fo-
undation of European industrialization (creating as much as 28.1% of the total added 
value of EU industry in 2017). Hungary, due to the presence of global strategic inve-
stors is characterized by a specific technological structure comparable with Germany 
(even more advanced regarding the share of high technology), although viewed by 
unit value of produced goods it is creating approximately 3.4 times cheaper produ-
ction per capita4. Finally, we chose Estonia as an example of a country with a high 
per capita income and stable GDP growth that is their opposite regarding the techno-
logical structure of industrial production, and thereby, in a relatively worse position 
than Serbia. Of course, the key development driver in this country are services, and 
within them, primarily, professional, scientific, innovation and technical activities.
Figure 4.  The share of the observed activities in the manufacturing gross value 
added (GVA) in 2016, in%
 
 
Source: author’s evaluation; Note: the colour intensity represents the range of technology - 
from black as high tech to white (low-tech).
Therefore, this illustrative example clearly shows that there are no uniform develop-
ment solutions, nor could it be said that only industrialization and its technological 
development are key for the tempo of growth. It is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition.
4 For details see: Nikolić, I., Stаmenković, S., Kovаčević, M. (2017). Investicioni ciklus i instituci-
onаlne reforme u 2018. kаo uslovi neophodnog privrednog rаstа nа srednji i dugi rok, a paper in: 
Nаučne konferencije: EKONOMSKA POLITIKA SRBIJE U 2018 g. - Kvаlitet institucijа i eko-
nomski rаst, 2017, Ekonomski fаkultet i Nаučno društvo ekonomistа, Beogrаd
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On the other hand, these findings should once again be taken with a reserve. Chart 3 
shows that a lack of serious production (unlike services, that are on the increase) in 
the segment of the ICT sector, requiring a high technological level and innovation at 
the EU level, is the main obstacle to achieving more considerable economic growth 
rates in Serbia. Furthermore, there is an even larger gap in the group of activities 
here called Global Innovation for Local Markets. The designers of our industrial and 
development policy must therefore give primacy primarily to: the automobile indu-
stry, pharmaceutics, mechanical engineering and electrical equipment manufacture. 
Unfortunately, Serbia could only compensate this gap within a reasonable future 
timeframe by attracting foreign strategic companies in these fields. Therefore any 
activities that will result in this are allowed and desirable.
4. Why has agribusiness been stuck during the last five years?
The agribusiness sector is very important for the dynamics of Serbian industry – 
food production employs over half a million people, while the food industry compri-
ses over one fifth of the total processing industry (just over 21% in 2018). However, 
over the long term and on average, agribusiness is showing a minimum contribution 
to the growth of the gross added value of the country (i.e. gross domestic product), 
while the food industry itself has been a deductive item for years due to poor finan-
cial performance.
As further confirmation of this hypothesis we intentionally use 2016 for comparison 
with previous years, even though it was extremely favourable for agricultural produ-
ction, yet even this could not contribute significantly to improving the performance 
of the agribusiness sector. Table 1 clearly shows that the total gross added value in 
the country is gradually increasing, but food production is stagnant.
Table 1. Average cumulative real GVA growth rates during the observed periods
2016/2008 2016/2011 2016/2013
Production of food products -1,7% 0,2% -0,4%
Production of beverages -27,1% -8,0% -3,2%
Production of tobacco products -55,8% -16,4% 14,3%
Agribusiness - total -0,8% 0,5% -4,2%
Total economy 3,0% 4,3% 1,8%
Source: Author’s calculation; Notes: Time series of GVA by activities are available on the 
SORS http://data.stat.gov.rs/Home/Result/0902010301?languageCode=en-US
Of particular interest is the finding for the production of foodstuffs during 2016 and 
in comparison to 2013, where it managed to reduce its gross added value level in the 
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absolute amount by RSD 4.18 billion5 while simultaneously the economy created 
new value by RSD 9.32 billion. Consequently, the food industry decreased the real 
growth of Serbian economy during this period by an incredible 44.9%.
Since agriculture registered a roughly double-digit year-on-year decrease in GVA in 
2017, we anticipate that the food industry will also be significantly reduced (at the 
moment of writing this paper official results for 2017 were not available), since its 
physical scope of activities compared to 20166 was reduced by 0.1%. The unfavoura-
ble trends have also been transferred to this year.
Numerous factors are contributing to such poor agribusiness performance. We will 
only list the most important ones here.
Firstly, insufficient demand presents a problem. Strong domestic demand is a key 
trigger of the dynamics of those areas of the processing industry where economies 
of scope and the learning curve effects are characteristic. Agribusiness is among 
these. When the living standard is low, and earnings have been further stagnating 
in the long-term, or are undergoing a real decrease, however significant the exports 
may be7, agribusiness suffers. The production of food products thus depends mostly 
on earning trends. Without their significant growth agribusiness cannot recover. 
Knowing this, we believe the announced considerable increase in salaries in pensi-
ons from the end of 2018 has been received with great relief in this industry.
Furthermore, it would seem that exports cannot properly compensate domestic inco-
me limitations due to another reason. Namely, it is well known that the main export 
destination for the food industry is the Western Balkans. Nearly one third of exports 
are placed on the markets of neighbouring countries that are no better regarding 
their standard, and where considerable real expansion in this sense in the mid-term 
is not likely. During 2017 exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Mace-
donia and Croatia only were worth EUR 962 million, representing 34.5% of the total 
export value of this sector.
By the way, when considering the potential of demand, it should be noted that it is 
good when it insists on product refinement. This provides an additional impetus for 
innovation and differentiation of products, more dynamic growth and competitive-
ness. 
5 Value expressed in constant 2010 prices.
6 Note that the food industry is showing a considerable discrepancy between the realized physical 
scope and newly created value (primarily an indicator of financial performance). Namely, the physi-
cal growth of activity in 2016 marked an increase of as much as 6% compared to 2015, while gross 
added value has seen only a symbolic 0.3%.
7 The total export of the agribusiness sector of the Republic of Serbia in 2017 reached EUR 2.79 bln, 
and was EUR 1.3 bln higher than imports.
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In this regard, the expressed desire, for example, of Germans for various types of 
local beer, the French for numerous types of cheese or Italians for diverse pasta pro-
ducts is welcome, and these three countries are important net exporters of precisely 
these products.
Another problem is the structure of production. Much like other areas of the proce-
ssing industry, agribusiness is dominated by the production of primary products with 
the lowest technological content. Therefore even the earnings made in exports are 
low. A confirmation of this hypothesis can be sought in the share of bulk products in 
the total export of the agribusiness sector. The share of this segment of agribusiness 
production in Serbia is traditionally between one fifth and one quarter of the total 
exports, certainly depending on agricultural yields.  On the other hand, EU countries 
on average register a share of bulk products in the exports of the agribusiness sector 
of merely around 4%. The most successful food industry countries, such as Germany 
and Italy, have even lower values; 3.1% and 2.4%, respectively. Similar relative sha-
res are exhibited by Greece, Spain and the Netherlands.
Unavoidably, there are also considerable issues with difficult product placement. 
These limitations include all the difficulties with the placement of products on the 
shelves of large retail chains, starting from the entry, to immediate positioning in 
them, in the broadest sense. This is a significant challenge for small and medium-si-
zed enterprises in the food sector in the domestic, not to mention in the foreign, 
competitive food product market in richer industrialized economies.
State support to this sector in Serbia is also incomparably lower than in EU co-
untries. The role of the state is to strengthen the efficiency precisely of the above 
determinants of production by adequate policies, programmes and instruments so 
that it can retain, or even better, sustainably improve the national competitive advan-
tage. EU countries are champions of this. Particularly in agriculture, they endeavour 
to affect the competitiveness of local food production through immense financial 
efforts. This is a fact, although it is also a dilemma whether this generates a more 
efficient agricultural sector.
Investments into research, development and innovation in agribusiness in the Re-
public of Serbia during recent years are approximately 0.03% of GDP, which is, 
relatively viewed, comparable with European countries. However, in Serbia, due to 
the large nominal difference in GDP, per capita allocations for these purposes are 
approximately four times lower than the EU average, while the lag after the most 
successful countries in food production is even greater. Without considerable inves-
tments into research, development, and innovation there is clearly no success in any 
industry, and thus in agribusiness either. Production cannot be modernized by itself, 
nor can its technological level be increased considerably without state support. It is 
important to realize that this is not an expense, but an investment in the future, and it 
would seem that our government recognizes this fact.
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5. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to emphasize the fact that Serbian economy, due to the 
reforms undertaken and the improvement of the investment environment, has cre-
ated a basis for sustainable economic growth in the mid-term. The growth of gross 
domestic product is primarily led by the dynamic growth of industrial production 
and investments. However, the results we have obtained show that maintaining high 
growth rates will be a challenge. The government must accelerate the transformation 
process of the Serbian economy into an innovation-based economy, which are not 
tied, like it was the case to date, and not necessarily exclusively, to large companies 
that are increasingly coming to Serbia. 
Our research precisely shows why technology matters to a company’s bottom line 
and exactly what impact it has. Innovation and technological progress will have to 
depend much more on local smarts and the potential we undoubtedly have. This 
is the only way to avoid the current destiny of a cheap labour country whose GDP 
growth depends primarily on the weather conditions.
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ŠTA JE DOVELO DO BRZOG RASTA SRPSKE  
PROIZVODNJE OD 2014. GODINE -  
ZAŠTO JE TEHNOLOGIJA VAŽNA?
 
REZIME
Krajem 2017. godine Srbija je dostigla najviši nivo industrijske proizvodnje u po-
slednjih četvrt veka. Brz rast je započet sredinom 2014. Uprkos tome ova analiza po-
kazuje da je industrijska dinamika praćena umerenom tehnološkom nadogradnjom, 
i dalje nedovoljnom za bitnije povećanje bruto dodate vrednosti. Uz to, upotrebom 
teorijsko-empirijskog pristupa - deduktivnih metoda, statističke i matematičke pro-
cene, autori zaključuju da ne postoje jedinstvena razvojna rešenja, niti se može reći 
da su isključivo industrijalizacija i njen tehnološki napredak ključni za tempo rasta. 
To je neophodan, ali ne i dovoljan uslov.
Ključne reči: proizvodnja, izvoz, dodata vrijednost, tehnološke promene. 
